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Recommendations for Preventing the Spread
of Vancomycin Resistance
Recommendations of the
Hospital Infection Control Practices
Advisory Committee (HICPAC)
Summary
Since 1989, a rapid increase in the incidence of infection and colonization
with vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) has been reported by U.S. hospi-
tals. This increase poses important problems, including a) the lack of available
antimicrobial therapy for VRE infections, because most VRE are also resistant to
drugs previously used to treat such infections (e.g., aminoglycosides and am-
picillin), and b) the possibility that the vancomycin-resistant genes present in
VRE can be transferred to other gram-positive microorganisms (e.g., Staphylo-
coccus aureus).
An increased risk for VRE infection and colonization has been associated with
previous vancomycin and/or multiantimicrobial therapy, severe underlying dis-
ease or immunosuppression, and intraabdominal surgery. Because enterococci
can be found in the normal gastrointestinal and female genital tracts, most en-
terococcal infections have been attributed to endogenous sources within the
individual patient. However, recent reports of outbreaks and endemic infections
caused by enterococci, including VRE, have indicated that patient-to-patient
transmission of the microorganisms can occur either through direct contact or
through indirect contact via a) the hands of personnel or b) contaminated pa-
tient-care equipment or environmental surfaces.
This report presents recommendations of the Hospital Infection Control Prac-
tices Advisory Committee for preventing and controlling the spread of
vancomycin resistance, with a special focus on VRE. Preventing and controlling
the spread of vancomycin resistance will require coordinated, concerted efforts
from all involved hospital departments and can be achieved only if each of the
following elements is addressed: a) prudent vancomycin use by clinicians,
b) education of hospital staff regarding the problem of vancomycin resistance,
c) early detection and prompt reporting of vancomycin resistance in enterococci
and other gram-positive microorganisms by the hospital microbiology labora-
tory, and d) immediate implementation of appropriate infection-control meas-
ures to prevent person-to-person transmission of VRE.
INTRODUCTION
From 1989 through 1993, the percentage of nosocomial enterococcal infections re-
ported to CDC’s National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) system that were
caused by vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) increased from 0.3% to 7.9% (1 ).
This overall increase primarily reflected the 34-fold increase in the percentage of VRE
infections in patients in intensive-care units (ICUs) (i.e., from 0.4% to 13.6%), although
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a trend toward an increased percentage of VRE infections in non-ICU patients also was
noted (1 ). The occurrence of VRE in NNIS hospitals was associated with larger hospi-
tal size (i.e., a hospital with ≥200 beds) and university affiliation (1 ). Other hospitals
also have reported increased endemic rates and clusters of VRE infection and coloni-
zation (2–8 ). The actual increase in the incidence of VRE in U.S. hospitals might be
greater than reported because the fully automated methods used in many clinical
laboratories cannot consistently detect vancomycin resistance, especially moderate
vancomycin resistance (as manifested in the VanB phenotype) (9–11 ).
Vancomycin resistance in enterococci has coincided with the increasing incidence
of high-level enterococcal resistance to penicillin and aminoglycosides, thus present-
ing a challenge for physicians who treat patients who have infections caused by these
microorganisms (1,4 ). Treatment options are often limited to combining antimicro-
bials or experimental compounds that have unproven efficacy (12–14 ).
The epidemiology of VRE has not been clarified; however, certain patient popula-
tions are at increased risk for VRE infection or colonization. These populations include
critically ill patients or those with severe underlying disease or immunosuppression
(e.g., patients in ICUs or in oncology or transplant wards); persons who have had an
intraabdominal or cardio-thoracic surgical procedure or an indwelling urinary or cen-
tral venous catheter; and persons who have had a prolonged hospital stay or received
multiantimicrobial and/or vancomycin therapy (2–8 ). Because enterococci are part of
the normal flora of the gastrointestinal and female genital tracts, most infections with
these microorganisms have been attributed to the patient’s endogenous flora (15 ).
However, recent studies have indicated that VRE and other enterococci can be trans-
mitted directly by patient-to-patient contact or indirectly by transient carriage on the
hands of personnel (16 ) or by contaminated environmental surfaces and patient-care
equipment (3,8,17 ).
The potential emergence of vancomycin resistance in clinical isolates of Staphylo-
coccus aureus and Staphylococcus epidermidis also is a public health concern. The
vanA gene, which is frequently plasmid-borne and confers high-level resistance to
vancomycin, can be transferred in vitro from enterococci to a variety of gram-positive
microorganisms (18,19 ), including S. aureus (20 ). Although vancomycin resistance in
clinical strains of S. epidermidis or S. aureus has not been reported, vancomycin-
resistant strains of Staphylococcus haemolyticus have been isolated (21,22 ).
In November 1993 and February 1994, the Subcommittee on the Prevention and
Control of Antimicrobial-Resistant Microorganisms in Hospitals of CDC’s Hospital In-
fection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) responded to the increase in
vancomycin resistance in enterococci by meeting with representatives from the
American Hospital Association, the American Society for Microbiology, the Associa-
tion for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, the Infectious Diseases
Society of America, the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America, and the Sur-
gical Infection Society. Meeting participants agreed with the need for prompt
implementation of control measures; thus, recommendations to prevent the spread of
VRE were developed. Public comments were solicited and incorporated into the draft
recommendations. In November 1994, HICPAC ratified the following recommenda-
tions for preventing and controlling the spread of vancomycin resistance, with special
focus on VRE.
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HICPAC recognizes that a) data are limited and additional research will be required
to clarify the epidemiology of VRE and determine cost-effective control strategies, and
b) many U.S. hospitals have concurrent problems with other antimicrobial-resistant
organisms (e.g., methicillin-resistant S. aureus [MRSA] and beta-lactam and amino-
glycoside-resistant gram-negative bacilli) that might have different epidemiologic
features and require different control measures.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Each hospital—through collaboration of its quality-improvement and infection-
control programs; pharmacy and therapeutics committee; microbiology laboratory;
clinical departments; and nursing, administrative, and housekeeping services—
should develop a comprehensive, institution-specific, strategic plan to detect, prevent,
and control infection and colonization with VRE. The following elements should be
addressed in the plan.
Prudent Vancomycin Use 
Vancomycin use has been reported consistently as a risk factor for infection and
colonization with VRE (2,4,7,8,17 ) and may increase the possibility of the emergence
of vancomycin-resistant S. aureus (VRSA) and/or vancomycin-resistant S. epider-
midis (VRSE). Therefore, all hospitals and other health-care delivery services, even
those at which VRE have never been detected, should a) develop a comprehensive,
antimicrobial-utilization plan to provide education for their medical staff (including
medical students who rotate their training in different departments of the health-care
facility), b) oversee surgical prophylaxis, and c) develop guidelines for the proper use
of vancomycin (as applicable to the institution).
Guideline development should be part of the hospital’s quality-improvement pro-
gram and should involve participation from the hospital’s pharmacy and therapeutics
committee; hospital epidemiologist; and infection-control, infectious-disease, medi-
cal, and surgical staffs. The guidelines should include the following considerations:
• Situations in which the use of vancomycin is appropriate or acceptable:
— For treatment of serious infections caused by beta-lactam–resistant gram-
positive microorganisms. Vancomycin may be less rapidly bactericidal than are
beta-lactam agents for beta-lactam–susceptible staphylococci (23,24 ).
— For treatment of infections caused by gram-positive microorganisms in patients
who have serious allergies to beta-lactam antimicrobials.
— When antibiotic-associated colitis fails to respond to metronidazole therapy or is
severe and potentially life-threatening.
— Prophylaxis, as recommended by the American Heart Association, for endo-
carditis following certain procedures in patients at high risk for endocarditis (25).
— Prophylaxis for major surgical procedures involving implantation of prosthetic
materials or devices (e.g., cardiac and vascular procedures [26 ] and total hip
replacement) at institutions that have a high rate of infections caused by MRSA
or methicillin-resistant S. epidermidis. A single dose of vancomycin adminis-
tered immediately before surgery is sufficient unless the procedure lasts
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>6 hours, in which case the dose should be repeated. Prophylaxis should be dis-
continued after a maximum of two doses (27–30 ).
• Situations in which the use of vancomycin should be discouraged:
— Routine surgical prophylaxis other than in a patient who has a life-threatening
allergy to beta-lactam antibiotics (28 ).
— Empiric antimicrobial therapy for a febrile neutropenic patient, unless initial evi-
dence indicates that the patient has an infection caused by gram-positive
microorganisms (e.g., at an inflamed exit site of Hickman catheter) and the
prevalence of infections caused by MRSA in the hospital is substantial (31–37 ).
— Treatment in response to a single blood culture positive for coagulase-negative
staphylococcus, if other blood cultures taken during the same time frame are
negative (i.e., if contamination of the blood culture is likely). Because contamina-
tion of blood cultures with skin flora (e.g., S. epidermidis ) could result in
inappropriate administration of vancomycin, phlebotomists and other personnel
who obtain blood cultures should be trained to minimize microbial contamina-
tion of specimens (38–40 ).
— Continued empiric use for presumed infections in patients whose cultures are
negative for beta-lactam–resistant gram-positive microorganisms (41 ).
— Systemic or local (e.g., antibiotic lock) prophylaxis for infection or colonization
of indwelling central or peripheral intravascular catheters (42–48 ).
— Selective decontamination of the digestive tract.
— Eradication of MRSA colonization (49,50 ).
— Primary treatment of antibiotic-associated colitis (51 ).
— Routine prophylaxis for very low-birthweight infants (i.e., infants who weigh
<1,500 g [3 lbs 4 oz]) (52 ).
— Routine prophylaxis for patients on continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis
or hemodialysis (48,53 ).
— Treatment (chosen for dosing convenience) of infections caused by beta-lactam–
sensitive gram-positive microorganisms in patients who have renal failure
(54–57 ).
— Use of vancomycin solution for topical application or irrigation.
• Enhancing compliance with recommendations:
— Although several techniques may be useful, further study is required to deter-
mine the most effective methods for influencing the prescribing practices of
physicians (58–61 ).
— Key parameters of vancomycin use can be monitored through the hospital’s
quality assurance/improvement process or as part of the drug-utilization review
of the pharmacy and therapeutics committee and the medical staff.
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Education Programs
Continuing education programs for hospital staff (including attending and consult-
ing physicians, medical residents, and students; pharmacy, nursing, and laboratory
personnel; and other direct patient-care providers) should include information con-
cerning the epidemiology of VRE and the potential impact of this pathogen on the cost
and outcome of patient care. Because detection and containment of VRE require an
aggressive approach and high performance standards for hospital personnel, special
awareness and educational sessions might be indicated.
Role of the Microbiology Laboratory
in the Detection, Reporting, and Control of VRE
The microbiology laboratory is the first line of defense against the spread of VRE in
the hospital. The laboratory’s ability to promptly and accurately identify enterococci
and detect vancomycin resistance is essential for recognizing VRE colonization and
infection and avoiding complex, costly containment efforts that are required when
recognition of the problem is delayed. In addition, cooperation and communication
between the laboratory and the infection-control program will facilitate control efforts.
Identification of Enterococci
Presumptively identify colonies on primary isolation plates as enterococci by using
colonial morphology, a Gram stain, and a pyrrolidonyl arylamidase (PYR) test. Al-
though identifying enterococci to the species level can help predict certain resistance
patterns (e.g., Enterococcus faecium is more resistant to penicillin than is Enterococ-
cus faecalis ) and may help determine the epidemiologic relatedness of enterococcal
isolates, such identification is not routinely necessary if antimicrobial susceptibility
testing is performed. However, under special circumstances or as laboratory re-
sources permit, biochemical tests can be used to differentiate between various
enterococcal species. Although most commercially available identification systems
adequately differentiate E. faecalis from other species of enterococci, additional tests
for motility and pigment production are required to distinguish Enterococcus galli-
narum (motile and nonpigmented) and Enterococcus casseliflavus (motile and
pigmented) from E. faecium (nonmotile and nonpigmented).
Tests for Antimicrobial Susceptibility
Determine vancomycin resistance and high-level resistance to penicillin (or am-
picillin) and aminoglycosides (62 ) for enterococci isolated from blood, sterile body
sites (with the possible exception of urine), and other sites as clinically indicated.
Laboratories routinely may test wound and urine isolates for resistance to vancomy-
cin and penicillin or ampicillin if resources permit (see Screening Procedures for
Detecting VRE in Hospitals Where VRE Have Not Been Detected).
• Laboratories that use disk diffusion should incubate plates for 24 hours and read
zones of inhibition by using transmitted light (62,63 ).
• Minimum inhibitory concentrations can be determined by agar dilution, agar gradi-
ent dilution, broth macrodilution, or manual broth microdilution (62–64 ). These
test systems should be incubated for 24 hours.
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• The fully automated methods of testing enterococci for resistance to vancomycin
currently are unreliable (9–11 ).
When VRE Are Isolated From a Clinical Specimen
Confirm vancomycin resistance by repeating antimicrobial susceptibility testing
using any of the recommended methods (see Tests for Antimicrobial Susceptibility),
particularly if VRE isolates are unusual in the hospital, OR streak 1 µL of standard in-
oculum (0.5 McFarland) from an isolated colony of enterococci onto brain heart
infusion agar containing 6 µg/mL of vancomycin, incubate the inoculated plate for
24 hours at 35 C (95 F), and consider any growth indicative of vancomycin resistance
(62,63,65 ).
Immediately, while performing confirmatory susceptibility tests, notify the patient’s
primary caregiver, patient-care personnel, and infection-control personnel regarding
the presumptive identification of VRE so that appropriate isolation precautions can be
initiated promptly (see Preventing and Controlling VRE Transmission in All Hospitals).
Follow this preliminary report with the (final) result of the confirmatory test. Addition-
ally, highlight the report regarding the isolate to alert staff that isolation precautions
are indicated.
Screening Procedures for Detecting VRE in Hospitals
Where VRE Have Not Been Detected
In some hospital microbiology laboratories, antimicrobial susceptibility testing of
enterococcal isolates from urine or nonsterile body sites (e.g., wounds) is not per-
formed routinely; thus, identification of nosocomial VRE colonization and infection in
hospitalized patients may be delayed. Therefore, in hospitals where VRE have not yet
been detected, implementing special measures can promote earlier detection of VRE.
Antimicrobial susceptibility survey. Perform periodic susceptibility testing on an
epidemiologic sample of enterococcal isolates recovered from all types of clinical
specimens, especially from high-risk patients (e.g., those in an ICU or in an oncology
or transplant ward). The optimal frequency of testing and number of isolates to be
tested will vary among hospitals, depending on the patient population and number of
cultures performed at the hospital. Hospitals that process large numbers of culture
specimens need to test only a fraction (e.g., 10%) of enterococcal isolates every
1–2 months, whereas hospitals processing fewer specimens might need to test all en-
terococcal isolates during the survey period. The hospital epidemiologist can help
design a suitable sampling strategy.
Culture survey of stools or rectal swabs. In tertiary medical centers and other hos-
pitals that have many critically ill patients (e.g., ICU, oncology, and transplant patients)
at high risk for VRE infection or colonization, periodic culture surveys of stools or rec-
tal swabs of such patients can detect the presence of VRE. Because most patients
colonized with VRE have intestinal colonization with this organism, fecal screening of
patients is recommended even though VRE infections have not been identified clini-
cally (2,4,16 ).
The frequency and intensity of surveillance should be based on the size of the
population at risk and the specific hospital unit(s) involved. If VRE have been detected
in other health-care facilities in a hospital’s area and/or if a hospital’s staff decides to
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determine whether VRE are present in the hospital despite the absence of recognized
clinical cases, stool or rectal-swab culture surveys are useful. The cost of screening
can be reduced by inoculating specimens onto selective media containing vancomy-
cin (2,17,66 ) and restricting screening to those patients who have been in the hospital
long enough to have a substantial risk for colonization (e.g., 5–7 days) or who have
been admitted from a facility (e.g., a tertiary-care hospital or a chronic-care facility)
where VRE have been identified.
After colonization with VRE has been detected, all the enterococcal isolates (includ-
ing those from urine and wounds) from patients in the hospital should be screened
routinely for vancomycin resistance, and efforts to contain the spread of VRE should
be intensified (i.e., by strict adherence to handwashing and compliance with isolation
precautions) (see Preventing and Controlling VRE Transmission in All Hospitals). In-
tensified fecal screening for VRE might facilitate earlier identification of colonized
patients, leading to more efficient containment of the microorganism.
Preventing and Controlling Nosocomial Transmission of VRE
Eradicating VRE from hospitals is most likely to succeed when VRE infection or
colonization is confined to a few patients on a single ward. After VRE have become
endemic on a ward or have spread to multiple wards or to the community, eradication
becomes difficult and costly. Aggressive infection-control measures and strict compli-
ance by hospital personnel are required to limit nosocomial spread of VRE.
Control of VRE requires a collaborative, institution-wide, multidisciplinary effort.
Therefore, the hospital’s quality-assurance/improvement department should be in-
volved at the outset to identify specific problems in hospital operations and
patient-care systems and to design, implement, and evaluate appropriate changes in
these systems.
Preventing and Controlling VRE Transmission in All Hospitals
The following measures should be implemented by all hospitals, including those in
which VRE have been isolated infrequently or not at all, to prevent and control trans-
mission of VRE.
• Notify appropriate hospital staff promptly when VRE are detected (see When VRE
Are Isolated From a Clinical Specimen).
• Inform clinical staff of the hospital’s policies regarding VRE-infected or colonized
patients. Because the slightest delay can lead to further spread of VRE and compli-
cate control efforts, implement the required procedures as soon as VRE are
detected. Clinical staff are essential to limiting the spread of VRE in patient-care
areas; thus, continuing education regarding the appropriate response to the detec-
tion of VRE is critical (see Education Programs).
• Establish system(s) for monitoring appropriate process and outcome measures
(e.g., cumulative incidence or incidence density of VRE colonization, rate of compli-
ance with VRE isolation precautions and handwashing, interval between VRE
identification in the laboratory and implementation of isolation precautions on the
wards, and the percentage of previously colonized patients admitted to the ward
who are identified promptly and placed on isolation precautions). Relay these data
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to the clinical, administrative, laboratory, and support staff to reinforce ongoing
education and control efforts (67 ).
• Initiate the following isolation precautions to prevent patient-to-patient transmis-
sion of VRE:
— Place VRE-infected or colonized patients in private rooms or in the same room as
other patients who have VRE (8 ).
— Wear gloves (clean, nonsterile gloves are adequate) when entering the room of
a VRE-infected or colonized patient because VRE can extensively contaminate
such an environment (3,8,16,17 ). When caring for a patient, a change of gloves
might be necessary after contact with material that could contain high concen-
trations of VRE (e.g., stool).
— Wear a gown (a clean, nonsterile gown is adequate) when entering the room of
a VRE-infected or colonized patient a) if substantial contact with the patient or
with environmental surfaces in the patient’s room is anticipated, b) if the patient
is incontinent, or c) if the patient has had an ileostomy or colostomy, has diar-
rhea, or has a wound drainage not contained by a dressing (8 ).
— Remove gloves and gown before leaving the patient’s room and immediately
wash hands with an antiseptic soap or a waterless antiseptic agent (68–71 ).
Hands can be contaminated via glove leaks (72–76 ) or during glove removal,
and bland soap does not always completely remove VRE from the hands (77 ).
— Ensure that after glove and gown removal and handwashing, clothing and
hands do not contact environmental surfaces in the patient’s room that are po-
tentially contaminated with VRE (e.g., a door knob or curtain) (3,8 ).
• Dedicate the use of noncritical items (e.g., a stethoscope, sphygmomanometer, or
rectal thermometer) to a single patient or cohort of patients infected or colonized
with VRE (17 ). If such devices are to be used on other patients, adequately clean
and disinfect these devices first (78 ).
• Obtain a stool culture or rectal swab from roommates of patients newly found to be
infected or colonized with VRE to determine their colonization status, and apply
isolation precautions as necessary. Perform additional screening of patients on the
ward at the discretion of the infection-control staff.
• Adopt a policy for deciding when patients infected or colonized with VRE can be
removed from isolation precautions. The optimal requirements remain unknown;
however, because VRE colonization can persist indefinitely (4 ), stringent criteria
might be appropriate, such as VRE-negative results on at least three consecutive
occasions (≥1 week apart) for all cultures from multiple body sites (including stool
or rectal swab, perineal area, axilla or umbilicus, and wound, Foley catheter, and/or
colostomy sites, if present).
• Because patients with VRE can remain colonized for long periods after discharge
from the hospital, establish a system for highlighting the records of infected or
colonized patients so they can be promptly identified and placed on isolation
precautions upon readmission to the hospital. This information should be comput-
erized so that placement of colonized patients on isolation precautions will not be
delayed because the patients’ medical records are unavailable.
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• Local and state health departments should be consulted when developing a plan
regarding the discharge of VRE-infected or colonized patients to nursing homes,
other hospitals, or home-health care. This plan should be part of a larger strategy
for handling patients who have resolving infections and patients colonized with
antimicrobial-resistant microorganisms.
Hospitals With Endemic VRE or Continued VRE Transmission
The following measures should be taken to prevent and control transmission of
VRE in hospitals that have endemic VRE or continued VRE transmission despite imple-
mentation of measures described in the preceding section (see Preventing and
Controlling VRE Transmission in All Hospitals).
• Focus control efforts initially on ICUs and other areas where the VRE transmission
rate is highest (4 ). Such areas can serve as reservoirs for VRE, allowing VRE to
spread to other wards when patients are well enough to be transferred.
• Where feasible, cohort the staff who provide regular, ongoing care to patients to
minimize the movement/contact of health-care providers between VRE-positive
and VRE-negative patients (4,8 ).
• Hospital staff who are carriers of enterococci have been implicated rarely in the
transmission of this organism (8 ). However, in conjunction with careful
epidemiologic studies and upon the direction of the infection-control staff, examine
personnel for chronic skin and nail problems and perform hand and rectal swab
cultures of these workers. Remove from the care of VRE-negative patients those
VRE-positive personnel linked epidemiologically to VRE transmission until their
carrier state has been eradicated.
• Because the results of several enterococcal outbreak investigations suggest a po-
tential role for the environment in the transmission of enterococci (3,8,16,17,79,80),
institutions experiencing ongoing VRE transmission should verify that the hospital
has adequate procedures for the routine care, cleaning, and disinfection of environ-
mental surfaces (e.g., bed rails, bedside commodes, carts, charts, doorknobs, and
faucet handles) and that these procedures are being followed by housekeeping per-
sonnel. To verify the efficacy of hospital policies and procedures, some hospitals
might elect to perform focused environmental cultures before and after cleaning
rooms that house patients who have VRE. All environmental culturing should be
approved and supervised by the infection-control program in collaboration with the
clinical laboratory (3,8,16,17,79,80 ).
• Consider sending representative VRE isolates to reference laboratories for strain
typing by pulsed field gel electrophoresis or other suitable techniques to aid in de-
fining reservoirs and patterns of transmission.
Detecting and Reporting VRSA and VRSE
The microbiology laboratory has the primary responsibility for detecting and re-
porting the occurrence of VRSA or VRSE in the hospital. All clinical isolates of
S. aureus and S. epidermidis should be tested routinely, using standard methods, for
susceptibility to vancomycin (62 ). If VRSA or VRSE is identified in a clinical specimen,
confirm vancomycin resistance by repeating antimicrobial susceptibility testing using
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standard methods (62 ). Restreak the colony to ensure that the culture is pure. The
most common causes of false-positive VRSA reports are susceptibility testing on
mixed cultures and misidentifying VRE, Leuconostoc, S. haemolyticus, or Pediococ-
cus as VRSA (81,82 ).
Immediately (i.e., while performing confirmatory testing) notify the hospital’s
infection-control personnel, the patient’s primary caregiver, and patient-care person-
nel on the ward on which the patient is hospitalized so that the patient can be placed
promptly on isolation precautions (depending on the site[s] of infection or coloniza-
tion) adapted from previous CDC guidelines (83 ) and those recommended for VRE
infection or colonization in this report (see Preventing and Controlling Nosocomial
Transmission of VRE). Furthermore, immediately notify the state health department
and CDC, and send the isolate through the state health department to CDC (telephone
[404] 639-6413) for confirmation of vancomycin resistance.
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